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Introduction:  Whither Utopia 
At this late date, it seems cliché to once again criticize the flaws of utopian thinkers.  There is a 
general consensus, at least within the parameters of neoliberal orthodoxy, that the collapse of 
the Berlin Wall signaled the end of grand utopian designs.  But this verdict was always 
premature, and the utopian impulse is still very much with us.  Indeed, both cyber-utopians as 
well as transhumanists speak in almost religious terms about the emancipatory possibilities of 
technology.  In this regard, however, they simply represent the latest expression of 
technological utopianism, or the belief that science and technological progress will finally 
eliminate social contradictions and establish lasting unity within (post)human societies.    
 In this essay I propose to examine the underlying philosophical assumptions which 
animate the worldview(s) of technological utopians, and I intend to criticizes technological 
utopianism for its failure to grapple with the problem of value-pluralism .  The first part of the 
essay sketches out my conceptualization of utopia in a general way, and then discusses 
technological utopias as a subset of the larger class.  The next section of the paper highlights 
examples of technological utopias in Western modernity, with a specific focus on Bacon’s New 
Atlantis.  In  the third part of the essay I develop a series of objections to technological 
utopianism which depart form Isaiah Berlin’s work on value-pluralism, and in the final section I 
offer concluding remarks.   
 
Part I:  What is Utopia? 
In an important study which charts the evolution of utopian concepts, Ruth Levitas has 
highlighted the fact that there is no consensus on how to define the word ‘utopia’; indeed, she 
describes the field of utopian studies as “an ideological battleground” (Levitas 3) where literary 
scholars, political theorists and polemicists (among others) stake out conceptual territory 
against the backdrop of a contested history.  There are significant tensions, for example, 
between descriptive and evaluative uses of the term, and the utopian impulse is manifested 
differently across space and time  
  Thus, it is essential to approach the task of attempting to demarcate utopia 
conceptually with an appropriate degree of modesty.   Nevertheless, in any discussion of utopia 
it is important to sketch out how the term is being used, even if it is deployed in idiosyncratic 
ways.  Moreover, in any essay which proposes to criticize aspects of the utopian tradition, it is 
important to understand what, precisely, is being criticized.  Therefore, it is necessary to 
describe, at least in a schematic fashion, the way(s) in which I propose to use the term here.  
While it is impossible to construct a definition of utopia which is completely immune to 
counterexamples and potential criticisms (and the conceptualization I propose is certainly no 
exception), we can at least attempt to minimize the number of possible objections raised, and 
this is my goal in the present essay.   
As Ruth Levitas has noted, there are at least three different strategies for delimiting the 
concept of utopia.  The first is to focus on the content of a specific definition, and more 
particularly its normative understanding of what constitutes a good society.  The second 
approach emphasizes literary form as a way to define utopia, while the third method identifies 
functionality as the key to identifying utopian impulses.  Levitas herself highlights problems 
with each of the alternatives, and contends that a better approach is to define utopia as “the 
expression of the desire for a better way of living” (8).   
There are significant virtues to Levitas’s definition.  First of all, it resonates with the 
conclusions of Ernst Bloch’s monumental and authoritative study The Principle of Hope, which 
compellingly demonstrates the importance of desire for the utopian tradition.  Secondly, it is 
general enough that it encompasses a wide variety of utopian experiments.  Finally, it allows us 
to incorporate an important element of utopian traditions which is all too often obscured by 
attempts to provide a rigorously objective definition; it recognizes that there is an ineliminably 
subjective dimension which animates utopian impulses, and this dimension is crucial in terms of 
understanding the motivations of the various individuals who participated in any number of the 
grand utopian experiments.  In short, it’s a necessary, if not sufficient, condition of any 
satisfactory definition of the term.   
 At the same time, it is odd to suggest that the desire for a better future is, in and of 
itself, sufficient to define either the utopian impulse or utopia itself.  It seems evident that we 
have any number of desires which relate to social improvement that we wouldn’t necessarily 
characterize as utopian; rather, they often emerge from reformist sensibilities.  The utopian 
tradition, unlike political or cultural movements which attempt to reorganize particular 
institutions within existing sociopolitical arrangements, is generally characterized by 
revolutionary impulses.  Utopianism is the demand for fundamental transformations which will   
introduce harmony into a world of chaos and disorder (Gray, 3).   
In addition to the problem of minimizing the ambitions associated with utopian projects, 
however, perhaps the most significant difficulty with Levitas’ proposed definition is that it tries 
to describe phenomena which are highly diffuse and heterogeneous in a single sentence.  A 
better alternative is to employ a Wittgensteinian family-resemblances style approach which 
attempts to identify a core set of features shared by various utopian movements.  This gambit is 
consistent with the strategy of Lyman Tower Sargent (one of the foremost scholars in utopian 
studies) who argues that we should think of utopia (at least in the West tradition) as a 
constellation of ideas and phenomena which have emerged as disparate groups have struggled 
for a better world (Sargent 2).  In addition to the desire for a better future, then, I will follow 
Kolakowski in claiming that utopians believe that “a definitive and unsurpassable condition is 
obtainable, one where there is nothing to correct anymore” (132).  A first corollary of 
Kolakowski’s conception is that utopia consists in the elimination of social contradictions, 
broadly construed; thus, the utopian vision is characterized by the insistence that we can 
dissolve social antagonisms and thereby produce harmony within the new order.  A second 
corollary, which is here adopted from Berlin’s “The Pursuit of the Ideal”, is the principle that we 
can resolve the apparent contradiction between differing sets of values (Berlin, 5-6).  Thus, a 
critical aspect of utopian belief-systems is the idea that we can ultimately eliminate the 
conceptual tension which characterizes, for example, the relationship between liberty and 
equality, or clemency and justice.   
 Under the genus of utopia broadly construed, however, there are a bewildering variety 
of species; if we survey the history of utopian politics over the past four centuries, for example, 
we can find exemplars of religious utopias, saturnalian utopias, industrial utopias, agricultural 
utopias, etc. (Manuel and Manuel 1-29).  In this essay I propose to focus on a specific subset of 
this broader class:  namely, technological utopias.  Technological utopians, qua utopians, 
endorse, at least implicitly, the normative principles/operative assumptions outlined above (i.e. 
the belief that the utopia they envision represents an unsurpassable horizon for the human 
species, as well as the idea that in their privileged vision of utopia antagonisms will dissolve and 
harmony will reign).  In addition, however, they adopt an important belief about the means 
used to arrive at the utopia in question:  they posit that we can eliminate the divisions in 
society through the use of technological means.  Thus, the technological utopian has an 
immense confidence in the power of technology; s/he contends that if we merely unleash the 
power of technical mastery we can eliminate the problem of immiseration, and through the 
elimination of immiseration we can ultimately remove the cause of social divisions.  Moreover, 
technological utopias are organized according to generally technocratic principles in which the 
solution to every social pathology is ultimately derived from the measured application of 
scientific expertise.   In the following section, I will highlight examples of technological utopias 
which are scattered throughout the history of Western modernity.  In order to uncover the 
origins of the technocratic vision, however, I proposed to begin with a brief overview of Hannah 
Arendt’s critique of Plato in The Human Condition. 
 
II. Technological Utopias in Modernity 
One of the earliest Western utopias was sketched out in Plato’s Republic, and it exhibits the 
various characteristics I have ascribed to utopian writing/practice with remarkable clarity.  In 
Book Four, to cite merely one example, we discover that Plato’s ideal city (the Kallipolis) is the 
perfect embodiment of justice; the various elements of the city are unified in a harmonious 
order which mirrors the arrangement of a well-ordered soul (Plato, 435a-439a).  Indeed, in 
many ways it provides the template which future utopian designs would emulate; as Hannah 
Arendt writes, Plato “was the first to design a blueprint for the making of political bodies [and 
it] has remained the inspiration of all later utopias” (Arendt, 227).   
 What Arendt finds significant and even remarkable about The Republic is the fact that 
the philosopher first of all acquires knowledge about the Forms and then applies his/her 
knowledge to the design of a new social order.  In this regard, the first social engineers of the 
Western tradition were Plato’s philosopher-kings.  Indeed, at 550b of The Republic Socrates 
says that the philosopher-king contemplates divine and orderly objects, and he will attempt to 
remake the polis based on his desire to replicate the beautiful symmetry of the Forms in the 
realm of human affairs.  In order to execute the task of creating utopia, however, the 
philosopher must begin by eliminating every trace of the old impurities which prevent the 
people from assenting to the rule of the wise.  Thus, Socrates says that the philosophers “would 
take the city and the people’s characters as their sketching slate, but first they would wipe it 
clean…They would erase one thing, I suppose, and draw in another, until they had made 
people’s characters as dear to the gods as possible” (Plato, 501a-501c).   
 While Plato’s utopia is not a technological utopia per se, it does establish the model 
which technocratic social engineers would later adopt.  Technological utopians in modernity 
were enthralled by the idea of demolishing the traditional foundations of existing 
economic/political arrangements in order to reconstruct them according to a rational model or 
template which would guarantee the emergence and preservation of social harmony.   It was 
necessary, they believed, to build the new society on a more secure foundation than tradition 
or authority.  The new social order would have reason as its foundation, with scientists and 
central planners in control of its organization.   
One of the first technological utopias in the history of Western literature is Francis 
Bacon’s New Atlantis, which was initially published in 1624.  Bacon’s sketch of utopia is 
narrated by one of the sailors  on an expedition which departs from Peru in search of the Orient 
and finds itself lost at sea, with diminishing provisions and dwindling hope.  By chance they sail 
into the port of an island called Bensalem, where they are taken in by the inhabitants and 
nursed back to health.  During their stay, the members of the crew are regaled with stories 
about the city’s wealth and prosperity.  They are ultimately introduced to an elder who belongs 
to an institution known as Salomon’s House, which was founded by one of Bensalem’s greatest 
kings.  The Salomon’s House is an institution which functions both as a college of scientific 
research and the center of political rule.  In describing the purpose of Salomon’s House, the 
elder offers a characterization which could easily double as the motto of the Enlightenment:  
“The End of our Foundation is the knowledge of Causes, and secret motions of things; and the 
enlarging of the bounds of Human Empire, to the effecting of all things possible” (Bacon, 480).   
Thus, by uncovering the basic scientific principles which govern the world, the elders 
simultaneously acquire the capacity to exercise mastery over nature.  Likewise, they have 
learned how to exercise mastery over their fellow citizens, and during a conversation with one 
of the island’s inhabitants Bacon’s narrator is informed that “there is not under the heavens so 
chaste a nation as Bensalem; nor so free from all pollution or foulness…For there is nothing 
amongst mortal men more fair and admirable, than the chaste minds of this people” (Bacon, 
476-77).   Indeed, for Bacon knowledge is power and technology will emancipate us from 
iniquity and suffering; as Mulford Q. Sibley comments, “[i]n the New Atlantis technique is king:  
men speculate primarily to exploit and ‘conquer’ Nature, and the conquest almost 
automatically lead[s] to better men and women” (Sibley, 17).  
This confidence in the capacity of science and knowledge to liberate us from the travails 
and divisions which have plagued human societies from time immemorial is a theme which 
recurs throughout the technological utopian tradition.  It plays a prominent role, for example, 
in Condorcet’s Outline of a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind, published in 
1795.  At the beginning of his discussion of the tenth and final epoch of human history, 
Condorcet avers that in the same way that the natural sciences can predict phenomena with 
ever greater certainty by uncovering the invariable laws which govern the universe, we can 
similarly discover general laws governing our moral/intellectual faculties which will help us to 
predict the future of the species (Condorcet, 265).  He anticipates that we are entering a period 
of immense progress in which political/economic inequalities will begin to dissolve, thanks at 
least in part to free-trade, the dissemination of the revolutionary energies unleashed in 
America and France, and the introduction of public education.   
The most dramatic part of Condorcet’s argument, however, is his insistence that we can 
also anticipate the perfection of the human condition.  He has an immense confidence in the 
capacities of science to eliminate suffering, and while he acknowledges that there are limits to 
human cognition, it is nevertheless the case that we can use new methods and technologies to 
gradually organize our knowledge and reduce complex phenomena to simpler formulas.  
Indeed, he believes that improvements in technology will lead to greater productivity, 
decreases in the amount of labor time necessary to perform essential tasks, a reduction in the 
number of accidents and improved health.   Likewise, one generation will pass on its wisdom to 
the next, and as a result the human race will continue its march towards perfection. 
Condorcet’s faith in the power of technology, knowledge and science exercised an 
immense influence within the French utopian tradition.  Thinkers such as Saint-Simon and 
Comte would echo his reverence for the social engineers who wielded their expertise with the 
intention of creating a harmonious social order, and this almost religious belief in the power of 
technology played a critical role in any number of nineteenth century utopias beyond the 
French orbit, such as Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward.  Likewise, the emphasis on social 
engineering would serve as the backbone of various utopias throughout the twentieth century, 
such as Skinner’s Walden II.  Indeed, the siren’s song of technological emancipation continues 
to echo in the contemporary visions of singularity-utopians such as Ray Kurzweil (2006), as well 
as the more fantastic predictions associated with the Human Genome Project, which promise 
to liberate us from our frailties through the power of genetic engineering.   
 
III. Technological Utopias:  Second Thoughts 
In this section I will sketch out my primary objections to technological utopias.  I’ll begin with 
concerns which specifically pertain to technological utopias, and I then turn to a deeper 
problem which haunts any utopian project, at least as I’ve defined it in the present essay.   
 Virtually all of the technological utopias I have mentioned here are governed by 
technocratic models of thinking in which social divisions are eliminated through the concerted 
use of applied science.  Indeed, an implicit assumption of the technological utopians is that 
every social division or cause of disharmony is soluble according to scientific means.   Yet this 
assumption is deeply problematic, given that social division is often a product of disagreements 
concerning culture and/or values, and such disputes are almost never brought to a successful 
resolution through technological measures.   
Moreover, one of the most striking features of the technological utopias I’ve discussed 
in the previous section is their immense confidence in the emancipatory power of knowledge 
and technology as an applied science.  But if we examine the two concepts in turn, we can see 
that neither science nor technical progress are goods in themselves (Kitcher 147-166).  If we 
think for a moment about science, for instance, it quickly becomes evident that we can use 
newly acquired knowledge for either benevolent or malevolent ends.  As for technology, there 
is an implicit assumption that the application of science will necessarily lead to a better society, 
but as the experience of modernity has demonstrated this is a flawed premise. The same coal 
plants that fuelled the magnificent progress of the Industrial Revolution spewed disease and 
death into the atmosphere.  The same railways that allowed us to span continents and bring 
nations together were used to facilitate rapid and efficient transportation from the peripheries 
of Europe to Auschwitz and Treblinka.    And when we split the atom, which undoubtedly 
represents one of the greatest scientific triumphs of the twentieth century, we discovered a 
miraculous new source of energy. Yet as Oppenheimer remarked when recalling his experience 
of watching the first atomic explosion, we simultaneously unleashed Thanatos, as the 
smoldering ruins of Hiroshima would eventually attest.   As Adorno and Horkheimer note in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, “the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster” (3).  
In response to this point, a technological utopian might argue that while 
science/technology aren’t good in themselves, they are unambiguous goods when they are 
wielded by social engineers who have the necessary expertise to  make the requisite decisions 
about how to order society.  Indeed, most technological utopias rely heavily on centralized 
planning of one kind or another (Hayek, 165-182).  Leaving aside obvious concerns about the 
concentration of power, however, there is a larger problem:  authors such as Bacon and 
Condorcet tend to presuppose a quasi-utilitarian conception of the good.  While it is certainly 
true that utilitarianism represents a compelling vision of moral life, it’s important to 
acknowledge that it is deeply controversial from the standpoint of metaethics and political 
theory (Nozick 42-45; Rawls, Theory, 183-192).  There are real concerns, for example that it fails 
to recognize the importance of basic rights, and that it subsumes ethical decision-making under 
the heading of mathematical calculation.  It may, of course, turn out that utilitarianism is best 
able to account for our basic moral intuitions, or we may decide that we should endorse 
utilitarianism after further reflection, but we have to concede that it is an immensely 
controversial approach to political decision-making, and we shouldn’t simply assume that it is 
the most appropriate normative theory for organizing society (as technological utopians all too 
often do).  
Yet there is an even deeper problem which haunts all utopias, technological or 
otherwise.  This is a classic argument initially developed by Isaiah Berlin, and the basic criticism 
is that utopian thinkers assumed that we could, indeed, bring conflicting values into harmony 
with one another.  Recall my earlier claim that disagreements within communities often arise 
from differing value-judgments, and at the limit there are certain disputes which we can’t 
resolve simply by forcing values to align with one another.  If it is ultimately possible to resolve 
such differences by aligning competing values with one another, the force of the objection is 
significantly diminished.  It is precisely at this point, however, that we can feel the power of 
Berlin’s critique. He contends that there are certain sets of values which necessarily clash with 
one another.  To cite merely one case, there are times when we feel tugged by the 
countervailing weight of our desire to render justice vis-à-vis a person who has wronged us, and 
our equally forceful desire to exercise mercy or clemency.  Or to mention Berlin’s own example, 
suppose that as a society we value both equality and liberty.  As he writes, “[e]quality may 
demand the restraint of liberty of those who wish to dominate; liberty…may have to be 
curtailed in order to make room for social welfare, to feed the hungry, to clothe the naked, to 
shelter the homeless, to leave room for the liberty of others, to allow justice or fairness to be 
exercised” (Berlin 12).  
 Is it feasible to suppose that technical advances will ultimately allow us to escape from 
the kinds of conceptual dilemmas highlighted by Berlin, as authors such as Bacon, Bellamy, etc. 
seem to assume?  There are clearly moral disagreements which result, at least partially, from 
resource scarcity, and to that extent we can anticipate that if we increase the aggregate 
number of resources available while keeping the demands for a resource as well as the total 
population constant they are potentially soluble.  But it’s clearly the case that not every 
disagreement in the realm of values is resolvable through purely technical means (think, for 
example, of the dispute between defenders of abortion rights and their opponents).   
 What prevented the technological utopians from recognizing this admittedly banal 
point?  One potential answer to this question is that most technological utopians implicitly 
assumed that the inhabitants of utopia would share a common vision of the good, and as I’ve 
noted above it typically has a distinctly utilitarian orientation.  If it’s the case that we have a 
monistic conception of the good and our community is homogeneous, then any number of 
questions do, indeed, become purely technical.  If we all agree, for example, that we should 
arrange our community in such a way that resources are distributed in an absolutely equitable 
way (although in practice this is frightfully difficult to achieve, even in the most simple forms of 
social organization), then we simply have to determine how to achieve this end as efficiently as 
possible.  As soon as we encounter the pluralism which characterizes many human societies, 
however, the solution is no longer this straightforward.   
  
IV. Conclusion:  “…there is no social world without loss” 
In a strangely poignant footnote which serves as a commentary on Berlin’s discussion of value 
pluralism, Rawls avers that  
values clash and the full range of values is too extensive to fit into any one social world; 
not only are they incompatible with one another, imposing conflicting requirements on 
institutions, but there exists no family of workable institutions that can allow sufficient 
space for them all.  That there is no social world without loss is rooted in the nature of 
values and the world, and much human tragedy reflects that (Rawls, Liberalism, 197).  
 
In this passage Rawls grasps the essential undoing of any utopia, technological or otherwise:  
human societies contain multitudes of diversity and difference.   Although our world is rapidly 
being transformed by the forces of globalization, it is still eminently possible to encounter 
pluralism in the world, and we can anticipate that no matter how powerful the impetus 
towards homogenization becomes we will always find individuals and, at the limit, entire 
cultures who refuse the Faustean pact with Western neoliberalism (i.e. more capital,  
investment and IMF loans, but only if you privatize vast sectors of the economy, drastically cut 
social spending, impose austerity measures, etc.).   
 What this entails, as Rawls clearly understands, is that there is no social space which can 
definitively reconcile every value.  There are, no doubt, forms of political/social organization 
which can accommodate a significant amount of pluralism; indeed, any number of liberal 
democracies across the globe have achieved remarkable success in this regard.  But even the 
most liberal regime encounters limits in terms of how much diversity it can tolerate, and this 
limit is, as Berlin rightly insists, a conceptual one; certain values are not only contingently, but 
necessarily, in conflict with one another.   
 As Rawls notes, the irreducible pluralism of values is one of the great sources of human 
tragedy.  As Hegel understood, it is at the core of Sophocles’ Antigone, where two sets of 
ethical commands clash with one another (Hegel 263-268), and it is precisely this sense of the 
tragic that the defender of utopia lacks.  Oscar Wilde famously said that a map of the world 
which has no place for Utopia isn’t worth perusing, but it’s also important to note that Utopia 
has no place for tragedy, and to that extent it is indeed, as Thomas More rightly understood, no 
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